Using research on the initiative as a point of comparison, we consider how frequently and for what ends state legislators use the referendum. Akin to initiative use, we find that legislators are constrained by procedural hurdles in their ability to place referendums on the ballot. However, in contrast to research on the initiative, which emphasizes the role of interest groups as the drivers of initiatives, our analysis suggests that referendum use is motivated by partisan legislative majorities seeking to achieve a mix of political and policy goals.
of research is surprising given that referendums are used in all but one state and they appear on the ballot twice as often as initiatives (Magleby 1984) .
As a consequence, besides the fact that both types of measures are either passed or rejected by state electorates, we know little about the differences and similarities in how these two institutions of collective policy making operate-often side by side. Yet, because initiatives and referendums travel different paths to the ballot, there are reasons to expect important differences between the two, particularly with respect to where agenda setting power lies. Research on the initiative posits that interest groups often use the process to circumvent, weaken, or constrain state governing institutions (Banducci 1998; Boehmke 2005a; 2005b; Gerber 1999; Matsusaka 1992; Matsusaka and McCarty 2001; Price 1975) . In contrast, because the referendum is under the purview of state legislatures, its use is likely governed by the preferences and goals of legislators.
The purpose of this article, then, is to compare how different variants of direct democracy-the referendum and initiative-are used to set the agenda for policy change in the American states. In the next section, we identify the political actors who use these processes and for what ends, as well as the institutional and political constraints under which they operate. We then test hypotheses derived from this framework using data for all initiative and discretionary referendums put before voters in the American states between 1990 and 2008. In the third section, we present the results of our analysis suggesting that the referendum and initiative work in fundamentally different ways. Most notably, although both are constrained by qualification requirements, we find in contrast to the initiative that interest groups are not a significant factor in qualifying referendums for the ballot. Instead, the partisan composition of state governing institutions affects referendum use, as well as the policy goals imbued in these proposals. We conclude by discussing the implications that our effort has for the literature and suggesting directions for future research.
Policy Making at the Ballot Box: Comparing the Initiative and Referendum
The study of direct democracy is largely synonymous with analyses of the initiative. Less well understood is the more commonly used (Magleby 1984 ) legislative referendum; the process whereby legislatures in 49 states are able to place either statutory or constitutional proposals before state electorates. Although both forms of direct democracy allow voters to have a voice in state policy making, there are important differences between the referendum and the initiative not least of which is what actors use each process to set the agenda for policy change. In the discussion that follows, we compare the initiative and referendum by considering the motivations that underlie why these processes are used to facilitate policy change and the political and institutional factors that constrain political actors' ability to use these processes.
Although labeled the "citizen" initiative and intended to break the influence of "special" interests, research on the initiative challenges the idea that the initiative is a tool of "grass roots" politics. In particular, the research demonstrates that organized interests are vital to the process, particularly in terms of qualifying proposals for the ballot (Banducci 1998; Boehmke 2005a; 2005b; Gerber 1999; Matsusaka 1992; Matsusaka and McCarty 2001; Price 1975) . Others have found that political parties use the initiative for agenda setting in elections (e.g., Nicholson 2005) .
In many instances, the policy goals that initiative proponents seek are designed to weaken state legislatures by imposing budgetary constraints or other restrictions such as term limits (Tolbert 1998; . Groups also may use the initiative to raise the profile of social issues that may get little traction in the legislature but may resonate in the electorate (Damore and Nicholson 2011) . In addition, organized interests may participate in initiative politics for reasons of organizational maintenance such as advertising the group and its agenda, and networking with like-minded interests (see Gerber 1999, 82) .
Whether initiatives are inherently skewed liberally or conservatively is less certain and a debate exists over whether the process produces outcomes closer to-or further from-a state's median voter (e.g., Besley and Case 2003; Camobreco 1998; Lascher, Hagen, and Rochlin 1996; Lax and Phillips 2009; Matsusaka 2001; 2004) . Regardless, the initiative process can see most any issue raised provided that proponents can overcome qualification hurdles. On this point, prior work emphasizes the role of procedural constraints such as signature requirements in limiting the number of proposals that qualify for the ballot (Banducci 1998; Boehmke 2005b; Bowler and Donovan 2004) .
In contrast, because the referendum originates within the legislature, we expect that the preferences of legislators, as opposed to other actors such as interest groups, will be preeminent. To be sure, legislators do not have free reign over referendum use as there are a number of instances when referendums must be put before voters. With the exception of Delaware, changes to state constitutions must be ratified by voters (Colantuono 1987; Fisch, 2006; Krislov and Katz 2008; Schmidt 1989; Zimmerman 2001) .
2 Some state constitutions require that proposals be periodically referred to the ballot asking voters whether they wish to hold constitutional conventions. On financial matters, state legislators must place full-faith-and-credit obligation bonds before the voters (Kiewiet 1995; Kiewiet and Szakaty 1996). 3 In these cases, referendum use in the American states is similar to the referendum process elsewhere in the world (see LeDuc 2003) . However, if we take a step back in the causal process, except for instances where state constitutions mandate that voters be asked whether they want to hold a constitutional convention, all other referendums originate at the discretion of the legislature. So, although bond proposals may require popular consent, it is a legislative prerogative to seek bond funding in the first place. Similarly, although referendums that seek to amend state constitutions must gain popular passage, it is the volition of the legislature that causes such proposals to be placed on the ballot.
A recent example may help to illuminate these dynamics. In 2010, the Oklahoma Legislature referred State Question 755 to the ballot. Better known as the "Sharia Law Amendment," the measure sought to prohibit Oklahoma courts from drawing on Sharia law when making rulings. Because the proposal would amend the Oklahoma Constitution, a referendum was required. This, however, does not explain why Oklahoma legislators pursued the policy; only that they sought to achieve their policy goals via the referendum. Moreover, the content of the measure belies the notion that the referendum is only used for issues that are unlikely to engender disagreement.
Indeed, central to developing our understanding of the referendum process is having some sense of the goals that legislators are likely to pursue via the referendum. To the extent that there is a literature on referendum use, it suggests that politicians may have political motivations for using them. Gazey (1971, 131) , for example, argues that legislators will use the referendum to "pass the buck" to the electorate on tax increases to avoid politically difficult decisions. This view is in keeping with the intuition of Romer and Rosenthal's (1979) model of agenda setting where politicians use the referendum for budget maximization. A particularly interesting motivation for referendum use turns on the fact that the process is often used to alter constitutions as in the case of Oklahoma's State Question 755 discussed above. By packaging preferred policies as legislatively referred constitutional amendments, legislators can commit their states to a policy that is procedurally more difficult to alter in the future.
At the same time, if referendum use is driven by a mix of policy goals and political motivations, legislators should be constrained in their ability to use the process. Earlier, we mentioned the procedural barriers that hinder initiative use. Similar hurdles exist for the referendum. Specifically, qualifying most referendums necessitates a high degree of coordination as many states require the support of super-majorities in both chambers, often in successive sessions. 4 The ability to overcome these hurdles should be greater in contexts where the same party controls both legislative chambers.
Thus, whereas prior research suggests that the presence of divided government may encourage initiative use as interest groups turn to the initiative to circumvent policy gridlock (Banducci 1998; see also Gerber 1996; 1999) , the effects of divided government for referendum use may be more nuanced. If the chambers of a state legislature are under the control of different parties, then it may be more difficult to muster the necessary support to qualify the proposal for the ballot, particularly if the policy goals being sought are partisan or ideological. However, if the two Houses are under the control of one party and the governorship is under the control of the other, then the legislature may use the referendum to circumvent a recalcitrant governor.
Thus far, our discussion has focused on the politics that underlie referendum use and the political and institutional factors that are likely to impede legislators' ability to place such measures on the ballot. Qualifying a referendum, of course, is no guarantee that the proposal will be approved at the ballot box. More generally, measure passage offers another important point of comparison between the initiative and the referendum. 5 The literature on the initiative suggests that interest groups may benefit even if a proposal does not pass. As noted above, organized interests may have goals (i.e., mobilization, networking, membership growth, etc.) besides policy change for qualifying initiatives. Interest groups may, in a sense, "win" even if a proposal loses at the ballot.
But the same is unlikely to hold for the referendum. Because of the degree of coordination required to qualify referendums, legislators may be hesitant to use the process unless there is a reasonable prospect that the proposal will pass. Moreover, because legislators have leeway over the content and timing of referendums, the ability to use the referendum successfully may reflect legislative capabilities as much as intent. There exists a rich vein of research (e.g., King 2000; Squire 1992; 2007) distinguishing between amateur and professional legislatures, and the consequences that professionalism has for representation, turnover, and decision making. The proliferation of term limits has further complicated these dynamics (Kousser 2005; Moncrief, Niemi, and Powell 2004) . All else equal, the skills needed to successfully package proposals may be less prevalent in amateur or term-limited legislatures, and as a consequence, these legislatures may produce fewer referendums that gain the support of the electorate.
One policy area where the prospects for passage may loom large is for proposals seeking to expand the scope of state government.
6 Literature on budget maximizing (Romer and Rosenthal 1979) and buck passing (Gazey 1971) suggests that legislators may use the referendum to propose tax increases to sidestep responsibility for such increases. At the same time, even the most well-crafted tax measure may fail given the electorate's antipathy toward higher taxes. In this regard, the referendum affords budget maximizing legislators (e.g., Democrats) another type of buck passing. By packaging referendums that expand the scope of government not as tax increases, but as bond proposals, legislators can achieve their preferred policy goals while avoiding the super-majority thresholds that exist in some states for such increases. 7 Moreover, unlike tax increases with their immediate costs, bonds provide increased spending in the short term with the costs pushed into the future.
In sum, the above discussion has designated the primary political actors who use the initiative (interest groups) and referendum (state legislators) to pursue policy change at the ballot, posited a set of political and policy motivations to explain why these actors seek to make collective decisions via direct democracy, and identified the political and institutional constraints under which these actors operate. In the case of the referendum, we have also considered factors affecting the likelihood of passage. Below, we turn our attention to the empirical analysis of these arguments.
Research Design
To evaluate hypotheses derived from the above discussion, we use data from the National Conference of State Legislatures' (NCSL) Ballot Measure Database for the years 1990 through 2008.
8 Below, we discuss the measurement of the dependent variables and the methodology used to estimate the statistical models. Appendix A details the measurement and data sources for the independent variables included in these analyses.
We present our analysis in three stages. In the first stage, we examine the frequency of referendum and initiative use. The dependent variables for these models are counts of the number of such proposals appearing on state ballots between 1990 and 2008. In operationalizing the dependent variable for the referendum analysis, we only consider referendums that appear on the ballot at the discretion of the legislature. Omitted then are all automatically referred referendums (the constitutions in 14 states require periodic referendums asking the citizenry whether they wish to hold a constitutional convention), referendums proposed by entities other than state legislatures (such as the Arizona Commission on Salaries for Elective Office or Florida's Constitutional Revision Commission), and popular referendums (a process used in 23 states that allow citizens to invalidate legislative actions). 9 For the initiative analysis, data are included for the 24 initiative states. For the referendum model, data are included for all states except for Delaware, which does not have the referendum process, and Nebraska. Nebraska is excluded because the state's unicameral and nonpartisan legislature yields no values for the size of the majority variables and precludes testing our hypothesis regarding the effects of divided partisan legislative control.
Consistent with Banducci (1998) and Boehmke (2005b) , we collapse the data over 2-year periods to account for off-year elections, as well as to make the data consistent with state legislative terms in most states. Thus, for each state, there are 10 observations (48 states by 10 observations for the referendum model, N = 480, and 24 states by 10 observations for the initiative model, N = 240). Following Boehmke (2005b) , the models are estimated as negative binomial regressions, with robust clustered (by state) standard errors (RCSEs) to control for cross-case dependency. Recent work by Harden (2011) , however, suggests that RCSEs may be biased downward, increasing the likelihood of Type I errors. Harden recommends using bootstrap cluster standard errors (BCSEs) with data such as ours. The BCSE estimates for these models are presented in Appendix B. Appendix B also provides an extension of our first stage analysis that addresses any dependency between the referendum and initiative processes that may exist in the initiative states (sans Nebraska) by simultaneously analyzing initiative and referendum use via a seemingly unrelated estimation strategy.
In the second stage, we consider some of the different purposes that may motivate referendum use by presenting biennial count models where the dependent variables are the number of referendums packaged as bond proposals and constitutional amendments using data from all states except for Delaware and Nebraska. These models are also estimated as negative binomial regressions with state-specific RCSE. Appendix B presents the BCSE estimates for these models.
In the final stage of our analysis, we examine the conditions that promote successful agenda setting by presenting a model of referendum passage. For this model, the unit of analysis is the referendum and the model is estimated using logit with RCSE for each state election year. To address selection effects between the agenda setting and passage stages, we examine both processes using a Heckman selection model. Appendix B presents the results of this analysis and the BCSE estimates for the passage model.
Results

Frequency of Referendum and Initiative Use
In our first stage analysis considering the frequency of referendum and initiative use, the main variables of interest capture the effects of institutional and political considerations on the frequency of referendum and initiatives appearing on statewide ballots. For institutional constraints, we include Initiative Qualification Difficulty and Referendum Qualification Difficulty and expect these variables' coefficients to sign negatively. For political constraints, we include a measure of split partisan control of the legislature (Divided Legislature) and a measure of interbranch partisan division (Divided Government). Because prior research (see Banducci 1998; Boehmke 2005b) suggests the importance of interest groups in promoting initiative use, we include a measure for the density of state interest group populations (Interest Groups) in both models.
Following Banducci (1998) and Boehmke (2005b) , we include controls for state partisanship (Republican Strength), ideology (State Liberalism), aspects of state legislative context (Legislative Professionalism and Term Limits), population (Population), and population change (Population Change). Smith and Fridkin (2008) find that in states with less interparty legislative competition, legislators were less likely to extend to voters the choice to adopt the initiative. To account for this, we include two additional control variables, Majority in Lower Chamber and Majority in Upper Chamber, measuring the size of the majority party's advantage in each chamber. The results for the model of initiative use are presented in the first column of Table 1 , and the second column does the same for all discretionary referendums.
Beginning with the benchmark initiative analysis, our results replicate the key findings of prior research (e.g., Banducci 1998; Boehmke 2005b) . The positive and statistically significant coefficient for Interest Groups indicates that as the density of a state's interest group population increases so does the volume of initiatives. With respect to divided government, consistent with Banducci (1998) , the results indicate that split partisan control of the executive and the legislative branches is a significant predictor of initiative use as Divided Government is positive and statistically significant, whereas the coefficient for Divided Legislature is statistically insignificant. Last, the coefficient for Initiative Qualification Difficulty is significant and positive, indicating that more stringent qualification requirements decrease the number of initiatives reaching the ballot.
The model of referendum use presented in the second column of Table 1 suggests a process with some similarities to the initiative, but also important differences. Most notably, whereas initiative use increases in contexts with higher interest group density, referendum frequency appears to be shaped by the partisan characteristics of a state's legislature. Specifically, although Interest Groups is insignificant, the coefficient for Divided Legislature is negative and statistically significant suggesting that referendums are more likely to emerge in contexts where one party controls both legislative chambers. As expected, although we find evidence that divided government matters for both types of measures, for initiative use the key division is between the branches, whereas for the referendum the partisan split of consequence is within the legislature.
At the same time, we do see similarities across both processes in terms of qualification thresholds. The coefficient for Referendum Qualification Difficulty is negative and statistically significant indicating that the more difficult the process for qualifying referendums, the less often the process is used; a result consistent with the effects for Initiative Qualification Difficulty from the initiative model. 10 Thus, across both forms of direct democracy, the easier the process, the more frequently it is used, and the more difficult the process, the less often it is used. More generally, the significant effects for Divided Legislature and Referendum Qualification Difficulty are consistent with our contention that referendums can be used for noncontroversial ends. As we note above, if the referendum is used to simply set the agenda for consensual issues, then it is less likely that these factors would systematically affect patterns of use.
The Preferences of Legislators
Although our results thus far offer useful insights into the differences and similarities between initiative and referendum use, we have not directly explored how legislators with different goals may utilize the process. Indirect evidence for this point can be gleaned from the analysis of all discretionary referendums (Table 1 , column 2), which indicates that the process is more likely to be used when one party controls both legislative chambers. To evaluate party effects more rigorously, we present two additional models of referendum use. For the first model, we consider the frequency of bond requests and here we expect that Democratic legislatures will be more frequent proposers. 7 For this analysis, the specification is the same as for the model examining all discretionary referendums with two exceptions. First, to capture the partisan differences, we replace Divided Legislature with two dummy variables coded one if the Democrats (Democratic Legislature) or Republicans (Republican Legislature) controlled the legislature. Thus, the referent category is legislatures characterized by split partisan control or instances when chambers are evenly divided. Second, we drop Referendum Qualification Difficulty. Because this variable captures qualification requirements for referendums that are packaged as constitutional amendments 10 (see Appendix A) and only 2% of the bond proposals in the data set are constitutional amendments, the variable has little theoretical bearing.
The results for the bond analysis presented in the third column of Table 1 support our expectations about partisan differences in the frequency of bond proposals. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for Democratic Legislature suggests that in states where Democrats control the legislature there are significantly more bond proposals placed on the ballot as compared with states where legislative control is split across parties. Conversely, the negative and significant coefficient for Republican Legislature indicates that bond proposals are less likely to emerge from legislatures controlled by the Republican Party as compared with the referent category. In light of these partisan differences, the performance of the control variable for state ideology (State Liberalism) merits mention. Of the three models of referendum use presented here, it is only for the bonds analysis that the variable is a significant predictor.
As we offer above, a key benefit for using the legislative referendum is that it can bind legislators' successors to the present legislators' policy preferences via the constitutionalization of preferred policies. To assess whether either party is more-or-less likely to use the referendum process for policy commitment, we model referendum usage where the dependent variable is the number of proposed referendums that are constitutional amendments. Specifically, we include Referendum Qualification Difficulty to assess the impact of qualification thresholds and Prior Amendments to control for the tendency of some states to frequently amend their constitutions for minor reasons. The variable is measured as the number of constitutional amendments prior to 1990. The results for this analysis are presented in the fourth column of Table 1 .
Here, we find no evidence of partisan differences in the propensity to use the referendum to alter state constitutions as Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature are statistically insignificant. Referendum Qualification Difficulty, however, is significant and in the expected direction, again demonstrating the dampening effect that more stringent qualification requirements have on referendum use. In addition, note that the control for prior amendments (Prior Amendments) is positive and significant.
Passage of Legislative Referendums
Of course, qualifying a referendum for the ballot does not guarantee that voters will accept the legislators' proposal. To evaluate whether legislators are able to skillfully time and frame their proposals, we present a model of referendums passage where the unit of analysis is the referendum (N = 1,536), and the dependent variable is coded one if the referendum was passed and zero if it failed.
11 This model is estimated as a logit function with RCSE clustered for each state election year.
In specifying the model, we consider that legislators may be more-or-less capable and face differing levels of opposition to their proposals in the broader political environment-all of which may affect the likelihood of passage. Thus, although some of the factors included as controls in prior models may not systematically affect the frequency of referendum use, they may influence the frequency of success. For example, regardless of content, legislators operating in more professional legislatures may be better able to package referendums in a manner that increases their chances of passage as compared with amateur legislatures or those where legislative service is capped. As a consequence, we expect that Term Limits will have a negative effect and Legislative Professionalism will have a positive effect on the likelihood of passage.
Organized interests may present another obstacle to passage. That is, although the role of interest groups at the qualification stage may be limited, groups may use their clout to work against passage, particularly if the referendum is used for nonconsensual policies that target specific interests. Thus, Interest Groups should sign negatively. In addition, as we note above, although legislators may consider the likelihood of passage when deciding whether to place discretionary referendum before voters, the ability to accurately predict electoral support may vary. Romer and Rosenthal (1979) and Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) argue that it may be more difficult to gauge voter receptivity in states where the population is rapidly changing. To the degree that such uncertainty increases in fast growing states, Population Change should have a negative effect on the likelihood of passage. Outcomes also may be more difficult to predict in states where the electorate is closely divided. This dynamic may be captured indirectly in states characterized by a partisan split between the legislature and the governor (Divided Government). To more precisely tap electoral competitiveness, we replace Republican Party Strength with Purple State: a dummy variable that equals one in states where the major-party index (Ceaser and Saldin 2005) is between 45% and 55%. We anticipate that Divided Government and Purple State will sign negatively.
Because success or failure also may be affected by the underlying issue, we include six variables tapping measure content: dummy variables coded one if the measure proposed a tax increase (Tax Increase), a tax decrease (Tax Decrease), a bond proposal (Bond Proposal), or sought to make the tax-raising process more (Taxes More Difficult) or less difficult (Taxes Easier). We also include an interval measure capturing the complexity of the proposal as indicated by the number of issue areas associated with the measure (Measure Complexity). Bowler and Donovan (1998) find that the more complicated an initiative measure is, the less likely it is to pass. The same may hold for referendums. We also control for the number of referendums on the ballot (Number of Referendums) and for states where a super-majority is required for passage of constitutional amendments (Super-Majority). For consistency with the prior analyses, we include controls for state ideology (State Liberalism) and population (Population). Last, we include variables (Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature) to assess whether partisan differences exist in the ability to successfully use the referendum. Table 2 presents the results of the analysis of referendum passage. Considering first the coefficients tapping legislative capabilities, the negative and significant coefficient for Legislative Professionalism indicates unexpectedly that state legislatures that are in session more often, are afforded greater resources, and are compensated more generously are less likely to see their referendums pass as compared with measures proposed by less professionalized legislatures. The results suggest that there is no difference in passage rates between legislatures that are not subject to term limits as compared to those legislatures where service is capped, as Term Limits is statistically insignificant.
The results do, however, suggest that organized interests and uncertain state political environments result in fewer referendums being passed. Specifically, the significant and negative coefficient for Interest Groups suggests that as the concentration of a state's interest group population increases, the number of referendums that are passed decreases. Similarly, referendums are less likely to pass in states characterized by competitive or less certain electoral environments. Indirect support for this point can be gleaned by the negative sign for Divided Government and more direct evidence comes from the negative and statistically significant performance of Purple State. At the same time, the insignificance for Population Change suggests that uncertainty, conceptualized in terms of fast growing populations, does not systematically affect referendum passage.
For the content variables, the results indicate that as compared with other types of referendums, voters are less likely to support measures that seek to raise taxes or make the tax-raising process easier or more difficult as the coefficients for Tax Increase, Taxes Easier, and Taxes More Difficult are negative and significant. However, voters appear to be more likely to support bond measures as compared with some other type of referendum as the coefficient for Bond Proposal is positive and statistically significant. The coefficients for the other two content variables (Tax Decrease and Measure Complexity) are not significantly different from zero. The results for the variables tapping the partisan composition of the legislature (Democratic Legislature and Republican Legislature) indicate that as compared with legislatures characterized by either tied or split partisan control, unified Republican and Democratic legislatures are systematically more likely to see their referendums pass, with the larger coefficient for Republican Legislature suggesting that Republican controlled legislatures are somewhat more successful agenda setters as compared to their Democratic counterparts.
Last, the coefficients for the control variables (Number of Referendums, SuperMajority, State Liberalism, and Population) are all statistically significant. Thus, it appears that the passage of referendums is unaffected by citizens' ideological orientations, by state size, super-majority requirements, or the number of referendums on the ballot. 
Discussion and Conclusion
As we noted at the outset, what we know about agenda setting and policy making via direct democracy stems from the study of the initiative. Less well understood is the legislative referendum although legislatively referred ballot measures are in many ways a potentially more significant policymaking instrument. As compared with initiatives, legislative referendums appear twice as frequently on state ballots, the process is used in more than twice as many states, and the referendum is more likely to be used to alter state constitutions.
In examining how the initiative and legislative referendums are used to set the agenda for policy change in the American states, we find important similarities and differences between these two forms of direct democracy. In terms of similarities, we find that both types of ballot measures are constrained by qualification requirements. The two processes primarily differ with respect to where agenda setting power resides. On this point, our analysis reaffirms the role of interest groups as a driver for initiatives (Banducci 1998; Boehmke 2005b) , presumably as means to circumvent interbranch partisan gridlock (Banducci 1998) . In contrast, although the ability of legislators to successfully use the referendum may be constrained by interest group opposition and electoral uncertainty (as well as policy content) once a proposal reaches the ballot, we find that referendum use is shaped by the partisan composition of state legislatures.
Although it may not be all that surprising that the preferences of legislators motivate referendum use and that we observe a greater number of referendums on the ballot in states where one party controls both legislative chambers, as far as we know, our analysis is the first to demonstrate this point. More broadly, the significant effects that we find for referendum qualification thresholds and the partisan composition of state legislatures are consistent with our argument that the referendum can be used to advance nonconsensual policies. Underlying our expectations and analysis is that legislators will turn to the referendum to achieve a mix of political and partisan goals that cannot be as easily realized through other policymaking processes. Again, this point may strike some as self-evident. However, conceptualizing the referendum in this manner is at odds with a conventional wisdom that views the process as largely a mechanical one that is used to advance noncontroversial policies.
Given the dearth of research examining referendum use in the American states, there are a number of avenues for future research. Two seem particularly worthwhile. First, although we use bonds and constitutional amendments as a lens through which to glean how partisan majorities may use the process, these considerations only scratch the surface of the politics underlying referendum use. As we discuss above, in 2010 the Oklahoma Legislature used a referendum to amend that state's constitution to prohibit the use of Sharia law in state court decision making. Moreover in 2010, the Missouri General Assembly referred a measure to the ballot that sought to exempt the state from certain aspects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. In 2011, state legislatures across the country prepared referendums to set the agenda for a variety of contentious issues. For example, Nevada's Democratically controlled legislature began the process to remove from that state's constitution a provision that caps the rate that mining proceeds can be taxed and constrains how this revenue can be distributed, whereas the Republican dominated Florida legislature referred a proposal to the ballot that sought to replicate Missouri's "Obamacare" measure and another seeking to make significant reforms to the Florida Supreme Court. Thus, a fruitful research project might be to assess the multiple dimensions of partisan conflict that underlie referendum proposals.
Second, with some exceptions (e.g., Kiewiet 1995; Kiewiet and Szakaty1996; Sears and Citrin 1985) , the study of bonds and the interrelationships between bonds and taxes has received little attention in the political science literature. Given the ubiquity of bond proposals presented to voters via the referendum, the politics underlying this aspect of state finance may be ripe for further inquiry. For instance, pairing our findings that in states where Democrats control the legislature and the citizenry tilts liberally that the number of bond proposals increases with the work of Matsusaka and McCarty (2001) and Dyck (2009) indicating that the initiative is used more frequently in such contexts to promote conservative budgetary processes suggests an interesting dynamic. It may be that Democratic legislators are strategically responding to signals emanating from the initiative front (Gerber 1996) by using bonds instead of taxes to expand state governmental capacity. Indeed, although voters are less likely to support referendums that seek tax increases or that seek to ease the tax-raising process, state electorates passed more than 80% of all bond proposals referred by state legislatures between 1990 and 2008.
More generally, considering the interrelationships between citizens' preferences and initiative and referendum use suggests an array of interesting possibilities for examining agenda setting and collective policy making at the state level. Damore and Bowler (2011) , for instance, examine how the initiative and referendum are used to promote distinctively different reforms to state governance structures with initiative proponents typically seeking to tighten the leash on policy makers, while legislators use the referendum to propose additional powers or enhance legislative autonomy.
In this regard, unlike any other policymaking mechanism, the legislative referendum straddles two important policy venues-direct democracy and state legislatures-and as such, lies at the nexus between direct and representative democracy. The referendum allows elected representatives to forge legislation-and thus set the agenda-yet, it also requires voter approval. In doing so, the legislative referendum is uniquely situated to resolve the democratic tension of a largely uninformed electorate that nonetheless wants control over political outcomes. Three-level measure of state referendum/constitutional amendment qualification requirements where zero is for states that do not require a proposed measure to be supported by a super-majority or in two successive legislative sessions to qualify for the ballot, one is for states requiring that a proposed measure be supported by either a super-majority or in two
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Appendix B Alternative Model Specifications
In preliminary analyses, we estimated the models presented in Tables 1 and 2 using a number of specifications including fixed and random effects specifications. The fixed effects specification is problematic as in some cases the models failed to converge and in other instances, either subsets of cases or variables were dropped. When the random The data used for this measure capture requirements for constitutional amendments advanced through the referendum process, as opposed to referendums more generally. Thus, although Referendum Qualification Difficulty is not a perfect indicator of the qualification requirements for all legislative referendums in the data set, they capture the requirements for the vast majority (two thirds of all referendums in the data set are constitutional amendments). Moreover, attempts to ascertain the requirements for referendums that are neither constitutional amendments nor general obligation bonds by inspecting state constitutions proved fruitless suggesting that these requirements are set by statute.
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effects specification is used, there are marginal differences in the effects for some of the control variables. However, the main inferences that we draw from the article are not sensitive to estimation strategy. Another issue associated with these data is the cross-case dependency stemming from the inclusion of multiple observations from the same states. We use robust cluster standard error (RCSE) using state as the clustering criteria; a common remedy in the literature including the work of Boehmke (2005a) , whose work on initiative use we build on. However, using Monte Carlo simulations of an ordinary least squares (OLS) model, Harden (2011) demonstrates that bootstrap cluster standard errors (BCSEs) outperform RCSE and yield estimates that are less likely to be biased. Tables B1 and  B2 provide the results of our models of initiative and referendum use and referendum passage using the BCSE estimation strategy where state is the clustering criteria and the model is estimated so that each cluster is resampled with replacement a thousand times. Across the four usage models, there are some differences between the RCSE and BCSE estimations. For the models examining all referendums, Term Limits falls out of significance and Term Limits and Republican Legislature fall out of significance for the bonds model using BCSEs. The most significant difference, although, is for the initiative model, where the BCSE estimates for Interest Groups are just outside the .05 threshold (p = .06, one-tailed) for statistical significance. For the passage models, there are no differences between the RCSE and BCSE specifications. Our data also raise concerns about the potential for cross-equation correlation of the error terms between initiative and referendum use in the 24 initiative states and between the agenda setting and passage models of the referendum analyses. Specifically, because the results presented in the first and second columns of Table 1 examining initiative and referendum use differ not just in terms of their dependent variables, but also the states being analyzed, these results may obscure differences in referendum use between states that do and do not have the initiative process. Descriptive statistics offer some support for such a dynamic as the correlation between the number of referendums and initiatives qualifying for the ballot in the initiative states is .41 (p = .001) and the mean number of referendums per biennium in the initiative states is 60% greater than in the noninitiative states (2.42 as compared with 3.92; t = −4.107, p < .001).
If there is dependency between these two agenda setting process, then the error terms across the equations presented in the first and second columns of Table 1 may be correlated, resulting in biased estimates. To address this concern, Table B3 presents the results of a seemingly unrelated estimation of the initiative and referendum models for the initiative states (excluding Nebraska). This estimation is carried out in three stages using STATA's suest command. In the first stage, each model is estimated separately with the procedure computing the robust estimator of each model's covariance. In the second stage, both equations are simultaneously estimated with statespecific RCSE (BCSE is not an option with this estimation strategy), as is the between-model covariances of parameter estimates. In the final stage, the equality of the coefficients common to each equation is tested to determine their independence. Specifically, the procedure yields a χ 2 test of significance such that a significant χ 2 value means that the hypothesis of the equality of the common coefficients across models cannot be rejected.
Inspection of the estimates presented in Table B3 indicates no substantive difference from those presented in the first and second columns of Table 1 . Specifically, the coefficients for all of the primary variables of interest (Interest Groups, Divided Legislature, Divided Government, Initiative Qualification Difficulty, and Referendum Qualification Difficulty) perform as before and there are minimal differences in the magnitude of their effects. Testing the equality of the coefficients for the three independent variables of primary theoretical interest (Interest Groups, Divided Legislature, and Divided Government) indicates that Interest Groups (χ 2 = 3.60, p = .06) and Divided Legislature (χ 2 = 3.52, p = .06) are statistically independent of each other, whereas Divided Government is not (χ 2 = 4.52, p = .03).
Appendix B (continued)
Specifying an analysis that captures dependency between the referendum agenda setting and passage models is less clear-cut. The most significant obstacle is that the model of referendum use presented in the second column of Table 1 and the passage  model presented in Table 2 employ different units of analysis (biennial counts vs. the individual measure). Each is also specified using a different estimator (negative binomial vs. logit). Moreover, in contrast to the analysis presented in Table B3 simultaneously comparing referendum and initiative use (two processes that share time and space), the relationship between referendum qualification and passage is sequential: A measure has to first qualify for the ballot before it can be either passed or rejected. Thus, a Heckman selection model, as opposed to a seemingly unrelated estimation strategy, is a more appropriate choice as the Heckman is designed to account for processes where a selection effect is likely to produce a nonrandomly selected sample. Failure to account for such a selection effect may yield biased results. The assumptions underlying the Heckman model as applied to our analysis would suggest that successful agenda setting is determined in part by what occurs at the agenda setting phase and as consequence, measures that are either passed or rejected at the ballot box are a nonrepresentative sample of the universe of potential referendums.
We are further constrained in how we model the selection stage by the limitations of our data. Specifically, our data allow us to construct a dependent variable for the selection stage that captures between state differences. However, these data do not allow us to capture within state comparisons (the number of referendums that were proposed but were rejected within the legislature). Thus, we measure our selection dependent variable as a dummy variable that is coded one for a biennium in which a state legislature qualified at least one discretionary referendum and zero for a biennium in which no discretionary referendum was qualified. The dependent variable for the passage stage of the analysis is a biennial ratio of the number of qualified referendums that passed and is a biennial ratio of the number of qualified referendums that passed. The Heckman estimates the selection model as a Probit function and the passage model using OLS. All states except for Delaware and Nebraska are included in the analysis and state-specific RCSEs are used to estimate the model's standard errors.
The independent variables included in the selection stage are the same as those for the referendum use model presented in the second column of Table 1 . For the second stage of the analysis modeling passage, the independent variables are recoded to be consistent with the model's unit of analysis. This primarily effects the measurement of the measure content variables. Specifically, Tax Increase, Tax Decrease, Bond Proposal, Taxes Easier, and Taxes More Difficult are measured for this analysis as a count of the number of such proposals appearing on the ballot for each state for each biennium. Measure Complexity is dropped as is Number of Referendums. The end result is that we are able to specify a selection model that approximates the process of interest but, because of limitations with the data, we are unable to specify a model that exactly replicates those presented in the second column of Tables 1 and 2. The results for the Heckman selection analysis are presented in the first and second columns of Table B4 .The third and fourth columns in Table B4 present the results for the selection and passage models analyzed separately. For the Heckman analysis, the estimated correlation between the errors across equations (ρ) is .22 and a Wald test of the independence of the error terms is insignificant suggesting that the two processes are statistically independent. Further evidence of this conclusion can be gleaned by comparing the Heckman selection results with the results when each model is run separately. The only difference of note is that Term Limits pops into significance when the passage model is run separately. Otherwise, the results are virtually unchanged. Thus, within the limitations detailed above, the results of this analysis suggest that the agenda setting and passage models are statistically independent. 3. State public corporations may issue moral obligation bonds. These bonds differ from general obligation bonds in two ways. First, moral obligation bonds are backed by income from the project being financed instead of a state government's full-faith-and-credit promise to use its taxation powers to pay off the bondholders. Second, moral obligation bonds are issued without voter approval (see Markham 2001) . 4. The Vermont Constitution is by far the most difficult to alter as amendments can originate only in the Senate every 4 years (prior to 1974 amendments could be proposed every 10 years). The proposal must then be supported by two thirds of the Senate and a majority of the House. Any amendment that passes both chambers must be passed a second time by majority votes in each chamber after a newly elected legislature is seated before it can be brought to the electorate for ratification. As a consequence, the Vermont Constitution has been amended just 26 times; a far cry from the 800 plus amendments to the Alabama Constitution. 5. Between 1990 and 2008, 74% of referendums and 44% of initiatives passed; see also Magleby (1984) on this point. 6. There is an extensive literature stemming from Romer and Rosenthal's (1979) agenda setting model examining passage of public school budget referendums (e.g., Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro 1982; Brokow, Gale, and Merz 1990; Priest and Fox 2005; Tedin, Matland, and Weiher 2001) and other local government referendums, such as flood control (Shabman and Stephenson 1994) , hospital construction (Fort 1988) , and public works (Martinez-Vazquez 1981) . The primary hypotheses of interest in this literature are assessing whether the agenda setter extracts greater spending than the median voter's ideal (see also Figlio and O'Sullivan 2001) and whether voters' decision making is driven by self-interest. Although informative, this vein of research focuses on local, as opposed to statewide referendums, and in the case of school finance referendums, the referendums are required, which allows the agenda setter to make take-it or leave-it offers to voters; a condition that does not apply to legislative referendums. 7. Descriptive data between 1990 and 2008 support this perspective. Across the 49 states that use the referendum, only 60 of the 617 referendums coded as tax and revenue related by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) proposed tax increases (148 proposed tax decreases, 25 sought to make the tax raising easier, and 24 sought to make it more difficult). In contrast, there were 268 referendums proposing bonds during this time period with 77% of such measures being proposed by Democratic legislatures. Because legislators may also pursue tax increases through normal legislative processes, these data do not allow us to assess whether legislators use general obligation bonds, which must be popularly ratified, as a substitute for tax increases, which may or may not be put before the voters, to finance expansions of state government. These data do, however, indicate that legislators seldom use the referendum to "pass the buck" for tax increases perhaps because the passage rate for these measures is only 50%. In comparison, more than 80% of bond measures during this period passed. 8. For the time period under investigation, the NCSL database contains 2,386 ballot measures (748 initiatives, 31.35%; 1,544 legislative referendums, 64.71%; 49 popular referendums, 2.05%; and 45, 1.89%, coded as other). 9. In all but two instances, the NCSL codes these measures as "other." 10. The performance for Referendum Qualification Difficulty for this analysis should be interpreted with a caveat. As we note in Appendix A, the data used to measure the variable capture requirements for constitutional amendments advanced through the referendum process, as opposed to referendums more generally. At the same time, given that two thirds of all referendums in the data set are constitutional amendments, the variable does capture the qualification requirements for the vast majority of referendums. 11. This analysis, too, is limited to discretionary referendums. Five referendums from Wyoming are excluded because we were unable to determine the outcome, and also excluded is the Mississippi flag referendum where voters were asked to choose among flag designs instead of vote "yes" or "no."
